Epictetus

Qu'est-ce que l'Absolu ? Dieu existe-t-il ?

God is a father: he gave us reason, sees us, assigns our role

Un Dieu personnelIl le dit expressément

Epictetus, whose lectures Arrian transcribed, is the Stoic who speaks most of God in a personal tone. In the Discourses he calls him father of gods and men, holds that being a son of Zeus should be enough never to think meanly of oneself, and asserts that God sees each of our movements because souls are joined to him as parts. God has given us the faculty that uses impressions and has brought us into the world as spectators and interpreters of his works; hence the fitting response is gratitude and hymn. The background remains the Stoic physics of an immanent god, but the language is relational: filial obedience, trust and thanksgiving.

Qui suis-je ? Existe-t-il un vrai soi ?

You are not your body: you are your choice, a fragment of God

Le Soi est l'AbsoluIl le dit expressément

The first line of the Handbook divides things into those that depend on us and those that do not, and all of Epictetus rests on that border. Body, property, reputation or office are not ours; the only thing truly our own is the faculty of choice (prohairesis), which uses impressions and decides about them, and which not even Zeus can overcome. In the Discourses he goes further: each person is a fragment of God and carries a part of him within, and should therefore be ashamed to defile with impure thoughts the god he carries inside. The true self is not the one that can be imprisoned or fall ill, but that free reason akin to the divine.

Pourquoi souffrons-nous ?

Things do not disturb us, but our judgements about what is not ours

L'ignorance de ce que nous sommesIl le dit expressément

Epictetus' most quoted sentence sums up his diagnosis: it is not things that disturb people but the judgements they form about them. Death is not terrible; terrible is the opinion that it is. The underlying error concerns identity: we take as ours what does not depend on us — body, possessions, reputation, the lives of those we love — and invest it with desire and aversion. Whoever desires what belongs to another will be hindered and will lament. The Handbook proposes correcting that judgement from the start, examining each impression and asking whether it concerns what depends on us; if not, it is nothing to us.

Que se passe-t-il après la mort ?

There is no Hades: we return to the elements we came from

Silence ou réserveIl le dit expressément

Epictetus treats death as the prime example of what does not depend on us. It is not terrible; terrible is the judgement that it is. In the Discourses he describes dying as a return to what is friendly and akin, to the elements we are made of, and specifies that there is no Hades or Acheron or Pyriphlegethon, but everything is full of gods and daimons. He recommends remembering, when kissing a child, that it is mortal, and regards death as an act of obedience to the one who gave us life: I must die, but I need not do so lamenting. There is no personal reward beyond death in his work.

Comment atteint-on la libération ou le salut ?

Watching oneself like an enemy in ambush: the school is a hospital

Par un travail intérieur conscientIl le dit expressément

Epictetus organises moral progress into three fields of exercise: desire and aversion, so as not to desire what does not depend on us; impulses and duties, so as to act in keeping with one's relationships; and assent, so as not to accept impressions without examination. None of this is done by reading: whoever boasts of understanding Chrysippus has not progressed, and the philosopher's school is a hospital one should leave in pain, not pleased. He demands constant attention, because a moment's carelessness loses what was gained, and asks the one who progresses to watch himself like an enemy lying in wait. Freedom is the fruit of conscious, daily work on oneself.

Faut-il un maître ?

The teacher heals like a physician, but progress is each person's own

Utile mais pas indispensableIl le dit expressément

Epictetus was a pupil of Musonius Rufus and ran a school in Nicopolis, and he conceives the teacher as a physician: the school is a hospital and the philosopher should discomfort, not please. He holds up Socrates and Diogenes as models to keep in mind. Yet he insists that no one can progress for another: the teacher cannot will in the disciple's place, and whoever seeks applause for his lectures has confused philosophy with oratory. Moreover, God has placed beside each person a guardian daimon who never sleeps and cannot be deceived, so that we are never alone. Outer guidance orients; the task belongs to each one's faculty of choice.

Le monde est-il réel ?

Everything that happens praises providence, for those who know how to look

Une création bonne et réelleIl le dit expressément

Epictetus hardly deals with physics, but he treats the world in a language of creation and providence. In the Discourses he holds that, for anyone with two qualities — the ability to see the whole and gratitude —, every single thing in the world is enough to praise providence: the sheep's wool, milk, the harmony between the sexes. God has made man a spectator and interpreter of his works, and it would be shameful to die without having contemplated them. Even what seems adverse has its place in the government of the whole. The world is real, good and ordered, and the fitting response to it is gratitude and song to God.

Qu'est-ce que l'amour ?

Only one who does not place his good in externals truly loves

Une bienveillance ordonnéeIl le dit expressément

Epictetus gives great importance to natural affection for one's own — children, parents, siblings, fellow citizens —, but wants to order it by reason. In the Discourses he criticises a father who abandoned his sick daughter because he could not bear to see her suffer: what he called love was inability to bear his own distress. In the discourse on friendship he holds that only the wise can love, because whoever places his good in money, fame or pleasure will end up in conflict with his friend, brother or father when interests collide. He advises remembering, when kissing a child, that it is mortal. It is affection without attachment, ordered by the duties of each relationship.

Sommes-nous libres ou tout est-il déterminé ?

You will chain my leg, but not even Zeus can overcome my will

Un libre arbitre réelIl le dit expressément

For Epictetus freedom is the centre of philosophy. Free is the one who lives as he wills, who cannot be compelled, hindered or forced, and only the one who places his desire in what depends on him achieves this. What depends on us is judgement, impulse, desire and aversion: in a word, our faculty of choice (prohairesis), which not even Zeus can overcome. Body, property and life can be chained; the will cannot. Epictetus at the same time accepts that the role we play in the drama is decided by another, like an actor receiving his part: ours is to play it well.

Pourquoi méditer ou prier ?

Before each impression: “You are an appearance, not what you seem”

Voir la réalité telle qu'elle estIl le dit expressément

Epictetus' central practice is to examine impressions before assenting to them. The Handbook advises saying to each harsh impression that it is an appearance and not the thing it represents, and testing it by the rule of whether it concerns what depends on us. That vigilance must be constant: a moment's carelessness is enough to lose what was gained. To this are added the morning and evening review, for which he quotes the Golden Verses, and gratitude: if we were nightingales we would do what nightingales do; being rational, we must sing hymns to God. To meditate is to see things as they are and not as hasty judgement paints them.

La raison peut-elle connaître l'ultime ?

Reason examines itself, but reading Chrysippus is not enough

L'étude et le savoirIl le dit expressément

For Epictetus reason is the only faculty that examines itself and all the others, and it is the gift by which God made us spectators and interpreters of his work. It can know what is necessary: what depends on us, what our nature is, how the whole is governed. Hence it demands study, beginning with logic, which teaches how to examine impressions. But study is not an end in itself: whoever boasts of being able to interpret Chrysippus' books should remember that had Chrysippus written clearly, he would have nothing to boast of. What matters is living according to what has been learned; knowledge that does not transform conduct has not truly been learned.

Se retirer du monde ou le transformer ?

Play well the role assigned to you: son, brother, citizen

La contemplation dans l'actionIl le dit expressément

Epictetus advises neither withdrawing from the world nor reforming it, but rightly occupying the place that belongs to each. In the Handbook he compares life to a play: the author decides whether the part is long or short, a beggar's or a king's; ours is to play it well. Duties are measured by relationships — father, brother, neighbour, citizen —, and in the Discourses he lists what being a human, a son, a brother or a councillor requires. All this without setting one's heart on what does not depend on oneself: acting in the world with attention turned to one's own faculty of choice. Only for the ideal Cynic, God's messenger, does he reserve a life without family or city.