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Stoicism

Epictetus

Ἐπίκτητος

50s – c. 135Historically documented person

Greek Stoic philosopher (c. 50–c. 135), born a slave in Hierapolis in Phrygia. In Rome he served Epaphroditus, a freedman of Nero, studied with Musonius Rufus and, once free, taught philosophy until Domitian expelled the philosophers from Italy. He then founded a school at Nicopolis in Epirus. He wrote nothing: his pupil Arrian recorded his lectures in the Discourses and the Handbook, which placed inner freedom and the distinction between what is and is not up to us at the centre of ethics.

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Epicteto en la portada de las obras de Séneca (Amberes, 1605)

Epicteto en la portada de las obras de Séneca (Amberes, 1605) · Public domain

In their words

«Of things some are in our power, and others are not.»

Manual 1, 1. Griego: Wikisource; inglés: George Long (1877); español: traducción propia.

Their central idea

What is up to us (ta eph' hēmin): It is the starting point of all Epictetus' teaching, with which both the Handbook and the Discourses open.

Biography

5 min read

A slave who taught freedom

No ancient philosopher spoke as much about freedom as Epictetus, and none had more reason to know its price. He was born a slave, he was lame and he wrote not a single line. What we know of his teaching we owe to a pupil, Flavius Arrian, who took notes of his classes at the school in Nicopolis and published them as the Discourses, and to a digest of those notes, the Handbook, which would become one of the most widely read moral books in the West. Of his life, by contrast, few certain facts survive, scattered in his own words, in Aulus Gellius, in the Byzantine Suda and in the commentary Simplicius devoted to the Handbook four centuries later.

Hierapolis and Rome

He was born around the year 50 in Hierapolis, a Greek city of Phrygia in Asia Minor known for its hot springs. His name, Epiktētos, means "acquired" and was a common slave name; we do not know what he was called before, if he had another name, or how he came to Rome. There he belonged to Epaphroditus, a freedman who had been Nero's secretary for petitions and, according to the Suda, one of his bodyguards; Epictetus recalls him in the Discourses as a vain master who fawned on a shoemaker merely because the man had entered the emperor's service. Aulus Gellius, in the second century, thought Epictetus' slavery too recent and well known to need proof.

He was lame. The Suda attributes it to a rheumatic disease; the pagan polemicist Celsus, quoted by Origen, told that his master was twisting his leg and that Epictetus, smiling, warned him he would break it, and when it broke, said: "Did I not tell you?" It is impossible to decide between the two versions, but lameness appears among his own examples: illness is an impediment to the body, not to the will, says the Handbook; lameness, to the leg, not to the will.

Musonius Rufus

His master allowed him to attend the lectures of the Roman Stoic Gaius Musonius Rufus, the most respected philosopher in the Rome of Nero and the Flavians, exiled several times. Epictetus mentions him with reverence: Rufus spoke in such a way that each listener thought someone had reported his faults to him; to anyone who praised him he replied that if they had time to praise him, he had spoken in vain. From Musonius he inherited a philosophy understood as practical exercise, and a model, Socrates, whom he quotes more than any other author. When he obtained his freedom is not known; by the end of the first century he was teaching in Rome.

Exile and the school at Nicopolis

Domitian expelled the philosophers from Rome and Italy, probably in 89 or around 93–95; Aulus Gellius says explicitly that Epictetus was among those banished. He settled in Nicopolis, the "city of victory" Augustus had founded in Epirus to commemorate Actium, a prosperous city on the sea route between Italy and Greece. There he opened a school attended by young men of well-to-do families, many of them Romans, preparing for a public career. The Historia Augusta claims Hadrian treated him with great friendship, a report scholars accept with caution.

In the school the texts of Chrysippus were read and commented on and logic was practised, but the Discourses preserve something else: the informal talks that followed the technical lesson, in which the master challenges, mocks, invents dialogues with a tyrant or a complaining pupil and repeats again and again the same question: is this up to you or not? "The philosopher's school is a hospital," he warns; one should leave it not pleased but in pain.

The life of a poor teacher

He lived very simply and never married. Simplicius relates that he lived alone for a long time and that in old age he adopted a child whom a friend was going to abandon out of poverty, taking a woman into his house to raise it. Lucian of Samosata mocks a collector who paid three thousand drachmas for the philosopher's earthenware lamp, hoping to acquire his wisdom by reading at night by its light. He died in Nicopolis around 135; the Suda extends his life into the reign of Marcus Aurelius, a report scholars consider unlikely.

Arrian and the books

Flavius Arrian of Nicomedia, later consul, governor of Cappadocia and historian of Alexander the Great, attended the school around 108. In a letter to Lucius Gellius prefacing the Discourses he explains that he did not compose them as a literary work but tried to write down word for word what he heard, to preserve a record of his master's thought and frankness, and that they had been published without his consent. Photius, in the ninth century, knew eight books of Discourses and twelve of Conversations; only four of the former survive, through an eleventh- or twelfth-century manuscript in the Bodleian Library on which all other copies depend. The Handbook or Enchiridion, a selection of maxims drawn from the Discourses, fared better thanks to monks, who adapted it in Christian versions.

What is up to us

Epictetus' thought starts from a division: "Of things, some are up to us and others are not." Up to us are judgement, impulse, desire and aversion; not up to us are the body, property, reputation and office. The only thing truly ours is prohairesis, the faculty of choice, which not even Zeus can overpower. What disturbs us is not things but our judgements about them. Hence a programme of training in three fields—desire, action and assent—which Pierre Hadot showed to be the key to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the most illustrious of his readers, who came to know his lectures through Junius Rusticus.

Afterlife

The Handbook was commented on by Simplicius in the sixth century, translated into Latin by Angelo Poliziano in 1479 and read by Montaigne, by Pascal—who set it against Montaigne in his Conversation with Monsieur de Sacy—and by the Neostoics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Spanish it was translated by el Brocense in 1600 and in verse by Francisco de Quevedo in 1635. In the twentieth century the psychologist Albert Ellis cited his saying about judgements as a forerunner of cognitive therapy, and the American pilot James Stockdale related that what he remembered of Epictetus helped him endure more than seven years of captivity in Vietnam.

Sources: Epicteto. Disertaciones (por Arriano) y Manual. Texto griego en Wikisource en griego; trad. inglesa de George Long, The Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments (Londres: George Bell, 1877), en Wikisource en inglés. · Long, A. A. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. · Aulo Gelio. Noches áticas, I 2; II 18; XV 11; XVII 19; XIX 1. Trad. inglesa de John C. Rolfe, The Attic Nights, Loeb Classical Library 195, 200, 212. Londres: Heinemann, 1927 (libros I–II en LacusCurtius). · Simplicio. Comentario al Manual de Epicteto. Trad. inglesa de Tad Brennan y Charles Brittain, Simplicius: On Epictetus' Handbook, 2 vols. Londres: Duckworth / Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. · Orígenes. Contra Celso, VII 53. Trad. inglesa de Frederick Crombie, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV. Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing, 1885.

Timeline

A life, year by year

Each point is a documented event. Click to read it, with its source and degree of certainty.

  1. 50s · age 0

    Birth

    Born a slave around the year 50 (the date is inferred from his life; there is no direct evidence) in Hierapolis in Phrygia, according to the Suda.

    Probable

  2. c. 65 · age 15

    Slave of Epaphroditus

    In Rome he belongs to Epaphroditus, a freedman and Nero's secretary for petitions (a libellis), who helped the emperor kill himself in 68 and was executed by Domitian around 95.

    Probable

  3. c. 70 · age 20

    Pupil of Musonius Rufus

    Attends the lectures of the Stoic Gaius Musonius Rufus, whom he quotes in the Discourses (I.1.27; I.9.29; III.23.29).

    Documented

  4. c. 85 · age 35

    Freedman and teacher in Rome

    He obtains his freedom at an unknown date and begins teaching philosophy in Rome.

    Probable

  5. c. 89 · age 39

    Expulsion of the philosophers

    Domitian expels the philosophers from Italy (in 89 or around 93–95). Aulus Gellius (XV.11.5) counts Epictetus among the exiles. He settles in Nicopolis in Epirus and founds his school.

    Probable

  6. c. 108 · age 58

    Arrian at the school

    The young Flavius Arrian of Nicomedia attends the lectures and takes the notes that will become the Discourses (date proposed by Fergus Millar).

    Probable

  7. c. 125 · age 75

    Friendship with Hadrian

    The Historia Augusta (Hadrian 16.10) states that the emperor treated the philosophers Epictetus and Heliodorus "with the greatest friendship". The report is isolated.

    Disputed

  8. c. 130 · age 80

    Adoption of a child

    According to Simplicius, in old age he adopts a child whom a friend was going to abandon out of poverty and takes a woman into his house to raise it.

    Tradition

  9. c. 135 · age 85

    Death

    Dies in Nicopolis around 135. The Suda extends his life into the reign of Marcus Aurelius, which is considered unlikely.

    Probable

  10. c. 140

    Publication of the Discourses

    Arrian's notes circulate with a letter to Lucius Gellius explaining that they were made public without his consent. Photius (cod. 58) will know eight books of Discourses and twelve of Conversations; four survive.

    Probable

  11. c. 146

    Marcus Aurelius reads Epictetus

    Junius Rusticus lends the young Marcus Aurelius the notes of Epictetus (Meditations I.7); the emperor will quote him often.

    Documented

  12. c. 530

    Simplicius' commentary

    The Neoplatonist Simplicius writes an extensive commentary on the Handbook, the source of several biographical reports.

    Probable

  13. 1479

    Poliziano's Latin translation

    Angelo Poliziano translates the Handbook into Latin and dedicates it to Lorenzo de' Medici.

    Documented

  14. 1600

    El Brocense translates it into Spanish

    Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas publishes "Doctrina del estoico filósofo Epicteto, que se llama comúnmente Enchiridion".

    Documented

  15. 1635

    Quevedo in verse

    Francisco de Quevedo publishes "Epicteto y Phocílides en español con consonantes", a verse paraphrase of the Handbook.

    Documented

  16. 1758

    Elizabeth Carter

    Elizabeth Carter publishes the first complete English translation of Epictetus' works.

    Documented

Works

Essential works

The works without which their legacy cannot be understood.

Discourses (as reported by Arrian) — Epictetus

Recorded oral teaching · c. 108

Discourses (as reported by Arrian)

Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου διατριβῶν βιβλία

Four surviving books (of the eight Photius knew) containing ninety-five talks given by Epictetus at his school in Nicopolis, preceded by Arrian's letter to Lucius Gellius. They are not treatises but lively conversations in which the master challenges pupils and visitors, invents dialogues, draws on examples from daily life—the bath, the sea voyage, the dinner, the gymnasium—and offers Socrates, Diogenes and Zeno as models. The theme running through them all is the distinction between what is up to us (our judgements, desires, impulses: prohairesis) and what is not (body, goods, reputation, office), and the freedom that comes from applying it. They deal with providence and man's kinship with God, friendship and family, illness, exile and death, the true Cynic and the false philosopher. They are preserved by an eleventh- or twelfth-century Bodleian manuscript on which all other copies depend.

9 editions · amazon.com

Handbook (Enchiridion) — Epictetus

Later compilation · c. 130

Handbook (Enchiridion)

Ἐγχειρίδιον Ἐπικτήτου

Fifty-three short chapters condensing Epictetus' ethics as rules of conduct. It opens with the division "of things, some are up to us and others are not", goes on to the maxim that we are disturbed not by things but by our judgements about them (5), life as a role in a play written by another (17), the banquet at which one takes moderately what comes (15), piety (31) and the signs of one who is making progress (48), and ends with lines of Cleanthes and Euripides and words of Socrates. It has been the most read text of Epictetus since late antiquity: Simplicius commented on it, Byzantine monks adapted it, Poliziano translated it into Latin (1479) and el Brocense (1600) and Quevedo (1635) into Spanish.

10 editions · amazon.com

Quotations

Quotations located in a specific work. Each carries its provenance and its level of confidence.

Of things some are in our power, and others are not.

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.

VerifiedManual 1, 1. Griego: Wikisource; inglés: George Long (1877); español: traducción propia.

1 / 10
Apocryphal quotes or disputed attributions (3)
  • «We have two ears and one mouth so that we can listen twice as much as we speak.»

    Often attributed to Epictetus, but Diogenes Laertius (VII.23) gives it to Zeno of Citium, founder of Stoicism, addressing a young man who would not stop talking.

  • «It's not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.»

    A modern paraphrase, not a literal quotation, of Handbook 5. The original speaks not of "reactions" but of the judgements (dogmata) we form about things.

  • «I was Epictetus, a slave, maimed in body, poor as Irus, and dear to the immortals.»

    An anonymous epigram in the Palatine Anthology (VII.676), sometimes presented as an epitaph Epictetus composed for himself. There is no basis for attributing it to him; it is a eulogy written by someone else.

Last words

There are no verifiable records of their last words.

No account of his death or of his last words survives. The biography Arrian wrote, according to Simplicius, the Life and Death of Epictetus, is lost.

Ask

What their work answers

Twelve great human questions and what their texts allow us to answer, with references. We never put words in their mouth.

  • What is the Absolute? Does God exist?

    God is a father: he gave us reason, sees us, assigns our role

    A personal GodStated explicitly

    Epictetus, whose lectures Arrian transcribed, is the Stoic who speaks most of God in a personal tone. In the Discourses he calls him father of gods and men, holds that being a son of Zeus should be enough never to think meanly of oneself, and asserts that God sees each of our movements because souls are joined to him as parts. God has given us the faculty that uses impressions and has brought us into the world as spectators and interpreters of his works; hence the fitting response is gratitude and hymn. The background remains the Stoic physics of an immanent god, but the language is relational: filial obedience, trust and thanksgiving.

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  • Who am I? Is there a true self?

    You are not your body: you are your choice, a fragment of God

    The Self is the AbsoluteStated explicitly

    The first line of the Handbook divides things into those that depend on us and those that do not, and all of Epictetus rests on that border. Body, property, reputation or office are not ours; the only thing truly our own is the faculty of choice (prohairesis), which uses impressions and decides about them, and which not even Zeus can overcome. In the Discourses he goes further: each person is a fragment of God and carries a part of him within, and should therefore be ashamed to defile with impure thoughts the god he carries inside. The true self is not the one that can be imprisoned or fall ill, but that free reason akin to the divine.

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  • Why do we suffer?

    Things do not disturb us, but our judgements about what is not ours

    Ignorance of what we areStated explicitly

    Epictetus' most quoted sentence sums up his diagnosis: it is not things that disturb people but the judgements they form about them. Death is not terrible; terrible is the opinion that it is. The underlying error concerns identity: we take as ours what does not depend on us — body, possessions, reputation, the lives of those we love — and invest it with desire and aversion. Whoever desires what belongs to another will be hindered and will lament. The Handbook proposes correcting that judgement from the start, examining each impression and asking whether it concerns what depends on us; if not, it is nothing to us.

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  • What happens after death?

    There is no Hades: we return to the elements we came from

    Silence or reserveStated explicitly

    Epictetus treats death as the prime example of what does not depend on us. It is not terrible; terrible is the judgement that it is. In the Discourses he describes dying as a return to what is friendly and akin, to the elements we are made of, and specifies that there is no Hades or Acheron or Pyriphlegethon, but everything is full of gods and daimons. He recommends remembering, when kissing a child, that it is mortal, and regards death as an act of obedience to the one who gave us life: I must die, but I need not do so lamenting. There is no personal reward beyond death in his work.

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  • How is liberation or salvation attained?

    Watching oneself like an enemy in ambush: the school is a hospital

    Through conscious inner workStated explicitly

    Epictetus organises moral progress into three fields of exercise: desire and aversion, so as not to desire what does not depend on us; impulses and duties, so as to act in keeping with one's relationships; and assent, so as not to accept impressions without examination. None of this is done by reading: whoever boasts of understanding Chrysippus has not progressed, and the philosopher's school is a hospital one should leave in pain, not pleased. He demands constant attention, because a moment's carelessness loses what was gained, and asks the one who progresses to watch himself like an enemy lying in wait. Freedom is the fruit of conscious, daily work on oneself.

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  • Is a teacher necessary?

    The teacher heals like a physician, but progress is each person's own

    Helpful but not indispensableStated explicitly

    Epictetus was a pupil of Musonius Rufus and ran a school in Nicopolis, and he conceives the teacher as a physician: the school is a hospital and the philosopher should discomfort, not please. He holds up Socrates and Diogenes as models to keep in mind. Yet he insists that no one can progress for another: the teacher cannot will in the disciple's place, and whoever seeks applause for his lectures has confused philosophy with oratory. Moreover, God has placed beside each person a guardian daimon who never sleeps and cannot be deceived, so that we are never alone. Outer guidance orients; the task belongs to each one's faculty of choice.

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  • Is the world real?

    Everything that happens praises providence, for those who know how to look

    A good and real creationStated explicitly

    Epictetus hardly deals with physics, but he treats the world in a language of creation and providence. In the Discourses he holds that, for anyone with two qualities — the ability to see the whole and gratitude —, every single thing in the world is enough to praise providence: the sheep's wool, milk, the harmony between the sexes. God has made man a spectator and interpreter of his works, and it would be shameful to die without having contemplated them. Even what seems adverse has its place in the government of the whole. The world is real, good and ordered, and the fitting response to it is gratitude and song to God.

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  • What is love?

    Only one who does not place his good in externals truly loves

    Ordered benevolenceStated explicitly

    Epictetus gives great importance to natural affection for one's own — children, parents, siblings, fellow citizens —, but wants to order it by reason. In the Discourses he criticises a father who abandoned his sick daughter because he could not bear to see her suffer: what he called love was inability to bear his own distress. In the discourse on friendship he holds that only the wise can love, because whoever places his good in money, fame or pleasure will end up in conflict with his friend, brother or father when interests collide. He advises remembering, when kissing a child, that it is mortal. It is affection without attachment, ordered by the duties of each relationship.

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  • Are we free, or is everything determined?

    You will chain my leg, but not even Zeus can overcome my will

    Real free willStated explicitly

    For Epictetus freedom is the centre of philosophy. Free is the one who lives as he wills, who cannot be compelled, hindered or forced, and only the one who places his desire in what depends on him achieves this. What depends on us is judgement, impulse, desire and aversion: in a word, our faculty of choice (prohairesis), which not even Zeus can overcome. Body, property and life can be chained; the will cannot. Epictetus at the same time accepts that the role we play in the drama is decided by another, like an actor receiving his part: ours is to play it well.

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  • Why meditate or pray?

    Before each impression: “You are an appearance, not what you seem”

    Seeing reality as it isStated explicitly

    Epictetus' central practice is to examine impressions before assenting to them. The Handbook advises saying to each harsh impression that it is an appearance and not the thing it represents, and testing it by the rule of whether it concerns what depends on us. That vigilance must be constant: a moment's carelessness is enough to lose what was gained. To this are added the morning and evening review, for which he quotes the Golden Verses, and gratitude: if we were nightingales we would do what nightingales do; being rational, we must sing hymns to God. To meditate is to see things as they are and not as hasty judgement paints them.

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  • Can reason know the ultimate?

    Reason examines itself, but reading Chrysippus is not enough

    Study and learningStated explicitly

    For Epictetus reason is the only faculty that examines itself and all the others, and it is the gift by which God made us spectators and interpreters of his work. It can know what is necessary: what depends on us, what our nature is, how the whole is governed. Hence it demands study, beginning with logic, which teaches how to examine impressions. But study is not an end in itself: whoever boasts of being able to interpret Chrysippus' books should remember that had Chrysippus written clearly, he would have nothing to boast of. What matters is living according to what has been learned; knowledge that does not transform conduct has not truly been learned.

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  • Withdraw from the world or transform it?

    Play well the role assigned to you: son, brother, citizen

    Contemplation in actionStated explicitly

    Epictetus advises neither withdrawing from the world nor reforming it, but rightly occupying the place that belongs to each. In the Handbook he compares life to a play: the author decides whether the part is long or short, a beggar's or a king's; ours is to play it well. Duties are measured by relationships — father, brother, neighbour, citizen —, and in the Discourses he lists what being a human, a son, a brother or a councillor requires. All this without setting one's heart on what does not depend on oneself: acting in the world with attention turned to one's own faculty of choice. Only for the ideal Cynic, God's messenger, does he reserve a life without family or city.

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Anecdotes and stories

Anecdotes and stories

Disputedsegunda mitad del s. I

The broken leg

The Platonist philosopher Celsus, who around 178 wrote a treatise against the Christians, wanted to show that pagan sages knew how to suffer better than Jesus. He gave the example of Epictetus: his master was twisting his leg, and the slave, smiling and unmoved, warned him: "You will break it." When the leg broke, he added: "Did I not tell you that you would break it?" What did your god say when he was being punished?, Celsus asked. Origen, who preserved the passage in order to refute it, answered that Jesus' silence had been more eloquent than any words. The Suda, on the other hand, says Epictetus was lame from rheumatism, and he himself, in his lectures, merely cites lameness as an example of what is not up to us.

Origin of the story: Origen, Against Celsus VII.53, quoting Celsus' True Doctrine (c. 178). It is a polemical account, written a century later with an apologetic purpose; the Suda (epsilon 2424) gives another cause. It cannot be verified.

Source: Orígenes. Contra Celso, VII 53. Trad. inglesa de Frederick Crombie, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV. Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing, 1885.

Documentedc. 100–170

The iron lamp and the clay lamp

Epictetus used to tell his pupils that he kept an iron lamp beside the household gods. One night he heard a noise at the window, ran down and found it had been stolen. He reflected that the thief had done what came naturally to him, and concluded: "Tomorrow you will find an earthenware one." One loses only what one has, he explained; the thief, by contrast, had paid for the lamp at the price of becoming a thief. Half a century later Lucian of Samosata mocked a rich collector who bought that clay lamp for three thousand drachmas, convinced that if he read at night by its light the old philosopher's wisdom would rub off on him.

Origin of the story: The theft is told by Epictetus himself in Discourses I.18.15. The purchase of the lamp comes from Lucian, The Ignorant Book-Collector 13, a satire: the price may be exaggerated.

Source: Epicteto. Disertaciones (por Arriano) y Manual. Texto griego en Wikisource en griego; trad. inglesa de George Long, The Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments (Londres: George Bell, 1877), en Wikisource en inglés.

Documentedc. 65–68

The master and the shoemaker

To show the absurdity of measuring people by their relation to power, Epictetus recalled a scene from his youth in Epaphroditus' house. His master had a slave shoemaker whom he sold as useless. The shoemaker ended up in the emperor's household and became Caesar's shoemaker. From then on, Epictetus said, you should have seen how Epaphroditus honoured him: "How is the good Felicio, I pray you?" And if anyone asked what the master was doing, they were told he was deliberating with Felicio. The anecdote, told ironically by one who had been a slave in that very house, is one of the few autobiographical glimpses in the Discourses.

Origin of the story: Discourses I.19.19–22, in Epictetus' own words as transmitted by Arrian.

Source: Epicteto. Disertaciones (por Arriano) y Manual. Texto griego en Wikisource en griego; trad. inglesa de George Long, The Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments (Londres: George Bell, 1877), en Wikisource en inglés.

Testimonymediados del s. II

The philosopher in the storm

Aulus Gellius was sailing from Cassiope to Brundisium when a violent storm broke. Among the passengers was a highly respected Stoic philosopher, who turned pale with fear like everyone else. When the danger was over, a rich, pleasure-loving Greek from Asia taunted him for fearing and turning pale as a Stoic; the philosopher dismissed him with Aristippus' retort: the debauchee had no reason to fear for his soul, but he had reason to fear for Aristippus'. When Gellius, alone with him, asked him seriously about the cause of his fear, the philosopher took from his bag the fifth book of Epictetus' Discourses, edited by Arrian, and showed him a passage: sudden impressions strike even the sage, who may turn pale and start without fault; what distinguishes him from the fool is that he does not give them his assent or hold them true. Gellius copied the passage, which is today the only long fragment of the lost books.

Origin of the story: Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights XIX.1, in the first person; Augustine summarises it in The City of God IX.4. It is fragment 9 in Schenkl's edition.

Source: Aulo Gelio. Noches áticas, I 2; II 18; XV 11; XVII 19; XIX 1. Trad. inglesa de John C. Rolfe, The Attic Nights, Loeb Classical Library 195, 200, 212. Londres: Heinemann, 1927 (libros I–II en LacusCurtius).

Testimonyc. 125–135

The adopted child

Epictetus lived alone for most of his life and argued in his lectures that the philosopher, like the Cynic, might forgo marriage to devote himself entirely to others. But, according to Simplicius, in his old age a friend of his, too poor to raise his son, was about to expose him—that is, abandon him, as ancient custom allowed. Epictetus took the child and brought a woman into his house to raise him. The gesture fits what he taught in Book I of the Discourses about natural affection: love of one's children is according to nature, and reason should not extinguish it but order it.

Origin of the story: Simplicius, Commentary on the Handbook (on the chapter about marriage), four centuries later; there is no other source. Discourses I.11 and III.22.67–82 for the doctrinal context.

Source: Simplicio. Comentario al Manual de Epicteto. Trad. inglesa de Tad Brennan y Charles Brittain, Simplicius: On Epictetus' Handbook, 2 vols. Londres: Duckworth / Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.

Disputedc. 117–135; leyenda medieval

The emperor and the philosopher

The Historia Augusta states that Hadrian, who liked to surround himself with learned men, treated the philosophers Epictetus and Heliodorus "with the greatest friendship". It is an isolated report, but plausible: the emperor travelled through Greece and Nicopolis lay on a busy route. In the Middle Ages a legend grew around it: the Debate of the Emperor Hadrian and the Philosopher Epictetus, a Latin riddle dialogue in which Hadrian asks what man is, what life is or what death is, and Epictetus replies with lapidary definitions. The text, which has nothing to do with Stoicism, circulated in many manuscripts and was even illustrated with miniatures of the two figures in conversation.

Origin of the story: Historia Augusta, Life of Hadrian 16.10 (a late source, end of the fourth century). The Altercatio Hadriani Augusti et Epicteti philosophi is a late, spurious anonymous work.

Source: Historia Augusta, «Vida de Adriano» 16, 10. Trad. inglesa de David Magie, Loeb Classical Library 139, 1921 (texto en LacusCurtius).

Teachings

Teachings

The notions that structure their thought, explained in context.

What is up to us (ta eph' hēmin)lo-que-depende-de-nosotros
It is the starting point of all Epictetus' teaching, with which both the Handbook and the Discourses open. Up to us are judgement (hypolēpsis), the impulse to act (hormē), desire (orexis) and aversion (ekklisis): in a word, what is our own doing. Not up to us are the body, property, reputation and office. The former are by nature free and cannot be hindered; the latter are weak, slavish and belong to others. Whoever takes what belongs to others as his own will suffer, lament and blame gods and men; whoever considers his own only what is his will be compelled or harmed by no one. The distinction does not invite passivity towards the world, but moves good and evil from outcomes to one's own attitude: duty is done just the same, but without depending on what is not in our hands.

Already formulated by the early Stoics in the debate on fate and responsibility, Epictetus makes it the practical axis of ethics and a daily exercise: before each impression, ask whether it is up to oneself or not.

Source: Graver, Margaret. «Epictetus». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (publicada en 2008, revisión sustancial de 2025).

Prohairesis (the faculty of choice)proairesis
Epictetus makes prohairesis—"choice", "will", "moral purpose"—the centre of the person. It designates not so much each particular decision as the capacity to judge, assent and choose that makes us human. It is the only thing truly ours: "you may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus can overpower" (Discourses I.1.23). Hence prohairesis is "by nature unhindered" and freedom is inalienable: it can be misused, but not taken away. Man's good and evil reside in it alone; everything else—the body, possessions, even life—is material on which prohairesis acts. The term, rare in earlier Stoics, comes from Aristotle, who uses it for deliberate decision; Epictetus turns it into the name of the moral self.

Margaret Graver and A. A. Long stress that it is Epictetus' most original contribution to Stoic vocabulary; it influenced Marcus Aurelius and, through the Christian versions, the idea of free will.

Source: Long, A. A. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.

The use of impressionsuso-de-las-representaciones
All experience reaches us as an impression (phantasia): something appears good, terrible, insulting. Animals use their impressions; human beings can also understand that use and examine it (Discourses I.6). Epictetus proposes a constant exercise: to stop before each impression and tell it "you are an impression, and not at all what you appear to be" (Handbook 1.5), examine it and withhold assent until one has checked whether it concerns what is up to us. The "correct use of impressions" (chrēsis tōn phantasiōn) is for him the proper task of man and the only one the gods left in our hands. Hence disturbance comes not from things but from the judgements we add to the impression (Handbook 5).

Part of Stoic epistemology, which distinguished impression from assent; Epictetus turns it into moral practice. Modern cognitive psychotherapy (Albert Ellis, Aaron Beck) has claimed it as a precedent.

Source: Graver, Margaret. «Epictetus». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (publicada en 2008, revisión sustancial de 2025).

The three fields of trainingtres-campos
In Discourses III.2 Epictetus distinguishes three fields (topoi) in which anyone who wants to be good must train. The first and most urgent is that of desire and aversion: not to desire what is not up to us, so as not to fail, and not to shun the inevitable, so as not to fall into it. The second is that of impulses to act and not to act, that is, of duties (kathēkonta): to act in an orderly and reasonable way as son, brother, citizen. The third, for those already making progress, is that of assent: not to be deceived or rush to judgement, even in sleep or drunkenness. Epictetus reproaches his pupils for beginning with the third—the logic of syllogisms—while neglecting the first two, from which the passions arise.

Pierre Hadot related these three fields to the three parts of Stoic philosophy (physics, ethics, logic) and showed that they structure Marcus Aurelius' Meditations as disciplines of desire, action and assent.

Source: Hadot, Pierre. La Citadelle intérieure. Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle. París: Fayard, 1992 (cap. sobre las tres disciplinas de Epicteto).

The role in the playpapel-en-el-drama
"Remember that you are an actor in a play, of such a kind as the author chooses: short if he wants it short, long if he wants it long. If he wants you to play a beggar, play it well; and the same if a cripple, a magistrate or a private person. Your business is to play well the part you are given; to choose it belongs to another" (Handbook 17). The image sums up Epictetus' ethics: we do not choose our circumstances, but we do choose how we perform them. The Discourses develop it in the theory of "roles" (prosōpa): each person has the common role of a rational human being and particular ones—son, father, citizen, senator—from which his duties follow. Knowing which role is ours is part of practical wisdom (Discourses I.2; II.10).

The theory of roles derives from Panaetius (via Cicero, On Duties I), but Epictetus gives it a religious accent: the author of the play is God.

Source: Epicteto. Disertaciones (por Arriano) y Manual. Texto griego en Wikisource en griego; trad. inglesa de George Long, The Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments (Londres: George Bell, 1877), en Wikisource en inglés.

Kinship with Godparentesco-con-dios
Epictetus is the most religious of the Stoics. If God is the father of men and human reason is "a fragment" of the divine (Discourses I.14; II.8), each person carries God within and should treat himself with the respect due to a temple. From this kinship (syngeneia) it follows that no one should feel lowly because of his origin or poverty, that all men are brothers—slaves too, "sons of Zeus" like their masters (I.13)—and that the sage may call himself a citizen of the world (I.9). Gratitude and the hymn to God for the order of the cosmos are, for him, the philosopher's tasks: "if I were a nightingale I would do what a nightingale does; I am a rational being: I must sing hymns to God" (I.16.20).

The personal tone of his theology made Christians read him sympathetically and adapt the Handbook for monasteries; some moderns have looked, without success, for direct Christian influence.

Source: Long, A. A. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.

Videos

Videos

Recordings, interviews and documentaries. Videos play from YouTube; they are not hosted here.

  • Estoicismo romano (II): Epicteto | La March

    Lecture· ES· 2023· 60 min

    Fundación Juan MarchOfficial channel

  • La filosofía helenística (III): El estoicismo · La March

    Lecture· ES· 2022· 59 min

    Fundación Juan MarchOfficial channel

  • Cynics, Stoics, Epicureans

    Lecture· EN· 2021· 45 min

    Gresham CollegeOfficial channel

  • The Slave Who Was Free | Berkeley's AA Long on Epictetus

    Interview· EN· 2025· 65 min

    Johnathan Bi

  • Stoicon 2018: Tony Long "Stoicism Ancient and Modern"

    Lecture· EN· 2018· 49 min

    Modern StoicismOfficial channel

  • The philosophy of Stoicism - Massimo Pigliucci

    Analysis· EN· 2017· 5 min

    TED-EdOfficial channel

  • A History of Philosophy | 16 Stoicism

    Lecture· EN· 2015· 63 min

    wheatoncollegeOfficial channel

  • Epictetus, the Enchiridion - Introduction to Philosophy

    Lecture· EN· 2011· 56 min

    Gregory B. Sadler - That Philosophy Guy

  • Epictetus, Discourses | Habits and Practice | Philosophy Core Concepts

    Lecture· EN· 2015· 14 min

    Gregory B. Sadler - That Philosophy Guy

  • Geschichte der Philosophie (5): Stoa, Epikureer und pyrrhonische Skepsis, Prof. Dr. Torsten Wilholt

    Lecture· DE· 2013· 76 min

    InstPhilOfficial channel

  • Monografia su EPITTETO

    Analysis· IT· 2021· 97 min

    Rick DuFer

Gallery

Gallery

Images with verified licences. Each keeps its authorship and attribution.

Manuscripts

Manuscripts

Manuscript witnesses and ancient texts, with their custodian and conditions of access.

  • GRC · Minúscula griega · Lecciones de c. 108; copia de los ss. XI–XII

    Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου διατριβῶν

    Surviving witness
    Arquetipo del que dependen todos los demás manuscritos de las Disertaciones
    Custodian
    Bodleian Library, Oxford · MS. Auct. T. 4. 13 (Misc. gr. 251)
Manuscripts →

Connections

Connections

Influences, discipleships and affinities. Documented relations are distinguished from similarities identified by analysis.

  • Influenced by

    Socrates

    Socrates is his constant model: he quotes him more than any other author, takes from the Apology and the Crito the idea that "Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot harm me" (Handbook 53) and proposes imitating his answer "I am a citizen of the world" (Discourses I.9).

    Documented relation

  • Influenced by

    Zeno of Citium

    He belongs to the school Zeno founded, and names him among his models alongside Socrates and Diogenes (Discourses III.23.32).

    Documented relation

  • Influenced by

    Diogenes of Sinope

    Diogenes is for him the example of the true Cynic and the free man; he devotes much of the discourse "About Cynism" (III.22) to him.

    Documented relation

  • Influenced by

    Plato

    He frequently quotes Plato's Socratic dialogues (Apology, Crito, Gorgias) as the source for the figure of Socrates.

    Documented relation

  • Disagreed with

    Epicurus

    He argues against Epicurus and the Epicureans in several discourses (I.23 "Against Epicurus"; II.20; III.7), reproaching them for denying man's natural sociability.

    Documented relation

  • Influenced

    Marcus Aurelius

    Marcus Aurelius came to know the notes of his lectures through Junius Rusticus (Meditations I.7), quotes him repeatedly and organises his Meditations according to his three fields of training.

    Documented relation

  • Ideas akin to

    Aristotle

    There is no evidence he read Aristotle, but his key term, prohairesis, comes from Aristotle's vocabulary of deliberate decision, which Epictetus turns into the name of the moral self.

    Similarity identified by analysis

  • Influenced

    Augustine of Hippo

    Augustine summarises in The City of God (IX.4) Aulus Gellius' story of the Stoic philosopher who, in a storm, justified his fear with a book of Epictetus, and uses it to discuss the Stoic doctrine of the passions.

    Documented relation

  • Ideas akin to

    Plotinus

    There is no evidence that Plotinus read him. His fullest commentator, Simplicius, was a sixth-century Neoplatonist who read the Handbook as ethical preparation for Platonic philosophy.

    Similarity identified by analysis

Sources

Sources

Bibliography and catalogues consulted for this profile.

  1. Wikidata, entidad Q183144 «Epictetus» (117 enlaces entre wikis; P31=Q5). Registra nacimiento hacia el 50 en Hierápolis y muerte en el 135 o el 138 en Nicópolis.
  2. Graver, Margaret. «Epictetus». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (publicada en 2008, revisión sustancial de 2025).
  3. Epicteto. Disertaciones (por Arriano) y Manual. Texto griego en Wikisource en griego; trad. inglesa de George Long, The Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments (Londres: George Bell, 1877), en Wikisource en inglés.
  4. Long, A. A. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
  5. Aulo Gelio. Noches áticas, I 2; II 18; XV 11; XVII 19; XIX 1. Trad. inglesa de John C. Rolfe, The Attic Nights, Loeb Classical Library 195, 200, 212. Londres: Heinemann, 1927 (libros I–II en LacusCurtius).
  6. Simplicio. Comentario al Manual de Epicteto. Trad. inglesa de Tad Brennan y Charles Brittain, Simplicius: On Epictetus' Handbook, 2 vols. Londres: Duckworth / Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
  7. Orígenes. Contra Celso, VII 53. Trad. inglesa de Frederick Crombie, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV. Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing, 1885.
  8. Luciano de Samósata. Contra un ignorante que compraba muchos libros, 13. Trad. inglesa de A. M. Harmon, Lucian, vol. III, Loeb Classical Library 130. Londres: Heinemann, 1921.
  9. Historia Augusta, «Vida de Adriano» 16, 10. Trad. inglesa de David Magie, Loeb Classical Library 139, 1921 (texto en LacusCurtius).
  10. Millar, Fergus. «Epictetus and the Imperial Court». Journal of Roman Studies 55 (1965): 141–148.
  11. Oldfather, W. A. «Introduction», en Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, vol. I. Loeb Classical Library 131. Londres: Heinemann / Nueva York: Putnam, 1925.
  12. Seddon, Keith H. «Epictetus (55–135 C.E.)». Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. «Epictetus», Wikipedia en inglés, y «Epicteto», Wikipedia en español (consultadas para hechos verificables y bibliografía; texto propio).
  14. Focio. Biblioteca, códice 58 (sobre Arriano). Trad. inglesa de J. H. Freese, The Library of Photius, vol. I. Londres: SPCK, 1920.
  15. Marco Aurelio. Meditaciones, I 7. Trad. inglesa de George Long (1862), Wikisource.
  16. Suda, s. v. «Epiktetos» (épsilon 2424). Suda On Line, trad. inglesa revisada.
  17. Hadot, Pierre. La Citadelle intérieure. Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle. París: Fayard, 1992 (cap. sobre las tres disciplinas de Epicteto).
  18. Antología Palatina, VII 676 (epigrama anónimo sobre Epicteto). Texto griego en Wikisource en griego.
  19. Bodleian Library, MS. Auct. T. 4. 13 (Arriano, Disertaciones de Epicteto; s. XI–XII). Ficha del catálogo de manuscritos medievales.
  20. Dobbin, Robert F. Epictetus: Discourses, Book I. Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
  21. Open Library: registros de las traducciones españolas antiguas del Manual — Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas, «Dotrina del estoico filosofo Epicteto, que se llama comunmente Enchiridion» (1600), y Francisco de Quevedo, «Epicteto y Phocilides en español con consonantes» (Madrid, 1635).
  22. Diógenes Laercio. Vidas de los filósofos ilustres, VII 23 («Zenón»). Trad. inglesa de R. D. Hicks, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. II, Loeb Classical Library 185. Londres: Heinemann, 1925 (texto en Wikisource).
  23. Agustín de Hipona. La ciudad de Dios, IX 4. Trad. inglesa de Marcus Dods, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, serie I, vol. II. Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing, 1887 (texto en New Advent).
Rights holder
Textos antiguos en dominio público; cada traducción y edición moderna pertenece a su traductor o editorial

Pending confirmation

What this profile has not yet been able to settle. We would rather say so than fill it in.

  • Antonio Brum (o Brun), traductor del Enquiridión en «Obras de los moralistas griegos» (1888): identificar y fechar su muerte para confirmar el dominio público.
  • Loeb de Oldfather: el ISBN 9780674992405 figura en Open Library sin número de volumen; confirmar que corresponde al vol. II (LCL 218).
  • Pláticas por Arriano (trad. Pablo Jordán de Urríes, 1957–1973): confirmar volúmenes y editorial de cada tomo.
  • Simplicio, On Epictetus' Handbook (Brennan y Brittain, 2002): falta ISBN verificado.
  • Ediciones con ISBN en francés (Les Belles Lettres, Souilhé), alemán e italiano no registradas en esta pasada.
  • Fragmentos: no se han inventariado uno a uno los fragmentos de la edición de Schenkl.
  • Fecha de nacimiento: solo «hacia el 50»; la de muerte, hacia el 135 (Wikidata da también 125 y 138).
  • Sin programa de afiliación verificado ni titular de derechos: autor antiguo; las editoriales citadas no se han comprobado como programas de afiliados.

Researched on 2026-10-25