Passages in Plato and Aristotle referring to Herakleitos.

Plato, Theaet. 160 D. Homer, and Herakleitos, and the whole company which say that all things are in motion and in a state of flux. Cf. 152 D H.

Kratylos, 401 D. According to Herakleitos all things are in motion and nothing abides. Cf. 402 A, and frag. 41; also 412 D, 440 C.

Plato also alludes to fragments 32, 45, 98-99.

Aristotle: Topica i. 11, 104 f 21. All things are in motion, according to Herakleitos.

Top. viii. 5; 155 f 30. Wherefore those that hold different opinions, as that good and bad are the same thing, as Herakleitos says, do not grant that the opposite cannot coexist with itself; not as though they did not think this to be the case, but because as followers of Herakleitos they are obliged to speak as they do.

Phys. i. 2; 185 b 19. But still, if in the argument all things that exist are one, as a cloak or a himation, it turns out that they are stating the position of Herakleitos; for the same thing will apply to good and bad, and to good and not-good, so that good and not-good, and man and horse, will be the same; and they will not be arguing that all things are one, but that they are nothing, and that the same thing applies to such and to so much.

Phys. iii. 5; 205 a 3. As Herakleitos says that all things sometime become fire.

De coelo i. 10; 279 b 16. And others in their turn say that sometimes combination is taking place, and at other times destruction, and that this will always continue, as Empedokles of Agrigentum, and Herakleitos of Ephesos.

De anima i. 2; 405 a 25. And Herakleitos also says that the first principle is soul, as it were a [58]fiery exhalation, of which all other things consist; for it is the least corporeal and always in a state of flux, and the moving is known by the moving; and he agreed with most thinkers in holding that things are in motion.

De part anim. i. 5; 645 a 17. And as Herakleitos is reported to have said to strangers who wanted to meet him, who stopped when they entered and saw him getting warm by an oven—for he bade them enter boldly, since, said he, gods are here—so should one enter upon the investigation of each of the animals without timidity, as there is in them all something natural and beautiful.

Met. i. 3; 984 a 7. Hippasos of Metapontum and Herakleitos of Ephesos call fire the first cause. Cf. 996 a 9, 1001 a 15.

Met. iii. 3; 1005 b 24. For it is impossible for any one to postulate that the same thing is and is not, as some think Herakleitos says.

Met. iii. 5; 1010 a 13. V. Frag. 41-42, supra.

Met. iii. 7; 1012 a 24. For the word of Herakleitos, that all things are and are not, seems to make all things true.

Met. x. 5; 1062 a 32. For one might ask Herakleitos himself after this manner and speedily compel him to agree that it is never possible for opposite statements to be true about the same things. Cf. 1063 b 24.

Met. xii. 4; 1078 b 12. For the doctrine of ideas is held by its supporters because they are convinced by Herakleitos’s words in regard to the truth, viz., that all things perceived by the senses are always in a state of flux; so that if there is to be a science and a knowledge of anything, it is necessary to assume the existence of other objects in nature besides those that are perceived by sense, for there can be no science of things in a state of flux.

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Eth. ii. 3; 1105 a 8. It is harder to fight against pleasure than against anger, as Herakleitos says.

Eth. vii. 3; 1146 b 30. For some believe their opinions no less strongly than what they know by scientific procedure; and Herakleitos is an example of this.

Eth. viii. 2; 1155 b 4. And Herakleitos says that opposition unites, and that the most beautiful harmony results from opposites, and that all things come into being through strife.

Eth. x. 5; 1176 a 6. As Herakleitos says, an ass would prefer refuse to gold, for natural food is sweeter to asses than gold.

Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 129. According to Herakleitos we become intelligent when we get this divine reason by breathing it in, and in sleep we are forgetful, but on waking we gain our senses again. For in sleep since the pores of the senses are closed, the mind in us is separated from what is akin to it in what surrounds us, and its connection through pores is only preserved like a sort of root; and being cut off it loses its former power of memory; but when we wake it peeps out through the pores of sense as through little doors, and entering into connection with what surrounds us it regains the power of reason.