The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa (4 vols., libros 1–18) · 3 · 100

809. If (as has already been said) the second Consciousness be the resulting effect of the loss or destruction itself of the previous Consciousness, then destruction is not annihilation, and, necessarily, after Nirvana has been once attained, there may be a new Consciousness or new birth, and, thus, after having again attained to Nirvana the same result may follow. The Buddhistic Nirvana, therefore, cannot lead to that final Emancipation which is indicated into the Brahmanical scriptures.

810. The Buddhists then, according to this argument, are not at all benefited by asserting the existence of a permanent Soul unto which each repeated Consciousness may inhere. The Soul, according to the Brahmanical scriptures, has no attributes or possessions. It is eternal, immutable, and independent of all attributes. The affirmance of attributes with respect to the Soul directly leads to the inference of its destructibility, and hence the assertion of its permanency or indestructibility under such conditions is a contradiction in terms, according to what is urged in this verse.

811. The commentator explains that the object of this verse is to point out that the senses, when destroyed, merge into their productive causes or the substances of which they are attributes. Of course, those causes or substances are the elements or primordial matter. This leads to the inference that though attributes may meet with destruction, yet the substances (of which they are attributes) may remain intact. This may save the Buddhist doctrine, for the Soul, being permanent and owing consciousness, etc., for its attributes, may outlive, like primordial matter, the destruction of its attributes. But the speaker urges that this doctrine is not philosophical and the analogy will not hold. Substance is conjunction of attributes. The attributes being destroyed, the substance also is destroyed. In European philosophy too, matter, as an unknown essence to which extension, divisibility, etc., inhere, is no longer believed in or considered as scientific.

812. Here the speaker attacks the orthodox Brahmanical doctrine of the character of the Soul.

813. Possibly because they art based on Revelation.

814. The first five are the effects of intelligence; the vital breaths, of wind; and the juices and humours, of stomachic heat.

815. Intelligence is called avyaya because it leads to Emancipation which is such. It is also called mahat because of its power to lead to Brahma which is mahat. Tattwanischaya is called the seed of Emancipation because it leads to Emancipation.

816. That path consists of yoga.

817. By casting off the mind one casts off the five organs of action. By casting off the understanding, one casts off the organs of knowledge with the mind.

818. i.e., in each of these operations three causes must exist together.

819. The inference is that the functions being destroyed, the organs are destroyed, and the mind also is destroyed, or, the mind being destroyed, all are destroyed.

820. The commentator correctly explains that na in nanuparyeta is the nom. sing. of nri (man), meaning here, of course, the dreamer. Nilakantha's ingenuity is certainly highly commendable.

821. Uparamam is yugapadbhavasya uchcchedam or extinction of the state of association of the Soul with the understanding, the mind, and the senses. This dissociation of the Soul from the understanding, etc., is, of course, Emancipation. Emancipation, however, being eternal, the temporary dissociation of the soul from the understanding, etc., which is the consequence of dreamless sleep, is the result of Tamas or Darkness. That dissociation is certainly a kind of felicity, but then it differs from the felicity of Emancipation, which is everlasting, and which is not experienced in the gross body.

822. In this verse the speaker points out that the felicity of Emancipation may at first sight seem to be like the felicity of dreamless sleep, but that is only an error. In reality, the former is untouched or unstained by darkness. Na krichechramanupasyati is the reading I take, meaning "in which no one sees the slightest tincture of sorrow." The kind of sorrow referred to is the sorrow of duality or consciousness of knower and known. In Emancipation, of course, there cannot be any consciousness of duality. Both the vernacular versions are thoroughly unmeaning.

823. In this verse the speaker again points out the similarity between dreamless sleep and Emancipation. In both swakarmapratyayah Gunah is discarded. Gunah, as explained by Nilakantha, means here the whole range of subjective and objective existences from Consciousness to gross material objects, swakarmapratyayah means karmahetu kavirbhava, i.e., having acts for the cause of their manifestation; this refers to the theory of rebirth on account of past acts.

824. The sense of the verse is this: all creatures are perceived to exist. That existence is due to the well-known cause constituted by Avidya and desire and acts. They exist also in such a way as to display a union between the body and Soul. For all common purposes of life we treat creatures that we perceive to be really existing. The question then that arises is—which (the body or the Soul) is destructible?—We cannot answer this question in any way we like, like for swaswato va katham uchcchedavan, bhavet (i.e., how can the Soul, Which is said by the learned to be Eternal, be regarded as destructible?) Vartamaneshu should be treated as, Laukikavyavareshu. Uchcchedah is, of course, equivalent to Uchcchedavan.

825. i.e., the gross body disappears in the subtile; the subtile into the karana (potential) form of existence; and this last into the Supreme Soul.

826. Merit and sin, and with them their effects in the form of happiness and misery both here and hereafter, are said to be destroyed when men become unattached to everything and practise the religion of abstention or nivritti. The paraphrase of the second line is asaktah alepamakasam asthaya mahati alingameva pacyanti. Alepamakasam asthaya is explained by the commentator as Sagunam Brahma asthaya.

827. Urnanabha is generic term for all worms that weave threads from within their bellies. It does not always mean the spider. Here, it implies a silk-worm. The analogy then becomes complete.

828. Nipatatyasaktah is wrongly rendered by the Burdwan translator. K.P. Singha gives the sense correctly but takes nipatali for utpatati.

829. Samudayah is explained by the commentator as equivalent to hetu.

830. Giving food and clothes to the poor and needy in times of scarcity is referred to.

831. The reading I adopt is Vrataluvdhah. If, however, the Bengal reading vrataluplah be adopted, the meaning would be "such men are deceived by their vows," the sense being that though acquiring heaven and the other objects of their desire, yet they fall down upon exhaustion of their merit and never attain to what is permanent, viz., emancipation, which is attainable by following the religion of nivritti only.

832. The object of Bhishma's two answers is to show that the giving of pain to others (sacrificing animals) is censurable, and the giving of pain to one's own self is equally censurable.

833. Existence comes into being and ceases. Non-existence also comes into being and ceases. This is the grammatical construction. The words, of course, imply only the appearance and disappearance of all kinds of phenomena.

834. This refers to the theory set forth in the previous sections about the Soul's real inactivity amidst its seeming activity in respect of all acts.

835. The Burdwan translator renders the second line as "six thousand Gandharvas used to dance before thee seven kinds of dance."

836. Both the vernacular translators have misunderstood this verse. A samya is explained as a little wooden cane measuring about six and thirty fingers breadth in altitude. What Vali did was to go round the Earth (anuparyagah, i.e., parihrityagatavan) throwing or hurling a samya. When thrown from a particular point by a strong man, the samya clears a certain distance. This space is called a Devayajana. Vali went round the globe, performing sacrifices upon each such Devayajana.

837. Pravyaharaya is explained by the commentator as prakrishtokaye.

838. I follow Nilakantha's gloss in rendering this verse. Hatam is explained as nirjivam deham, i.e., the body divested of Soul. He who slays another is himself slain, means that a person who regards his own self as the slayer is steeped in ignorance, for the Soul is never an actor. By thinking that he is the actor a person invests his Soul with the attributes of the body and the senses. Such a man (as already said) is Hatah or slain (i.e., steeped in ignorance). Comparing this with verse 19 of Sec. 11 of the Gita, we find that the same thing is asserted therein a slightly different way. 'He who regards the Soul as the slayer and he who regards it as slain are both mistaken. The Soul does not slay nor is slain.'