The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa (4 vols., libros 1–18) · 3 · 110

1109. i.e., they could be slain by only their equals who were engaged with them, meaning that all those warriors were very superior men. They could not possibly be slain by others than those with whom they fought.

1110. In the case of gods and Rishis, thinking and summoning are the same.

1111. The commentator explains that the accusatives in the first line of verse 5 governed by hareyam in the previous verse.

1112. A Padmaka consists of ten digits, i.e., a thousand millions or a billion according to the French method of calculation.

1113. To lead a life in the woods with the deer and after the manner of the deer confers great merit. Vide the story of Yayati's daughter Madhavi in the Udyoga Parvam ante.

1114. The commentator explains that this means that Death would attain to the status of all-pervading Brahma. Even this is the boon that the Self-born grants her for protecting her against iniquity and allaying her fears.

1115. i.e., being freed from wrath and aversion.

1116. Vasishtha's work commences with the query—What is dharmah? The first answer is 'anything consistent with the Srutis and the Smritis.' Then comes Sishtacharah or the conduct of those called Sishta or the good.

1117. However casuists may argue and moralists pretend, a lie like that of Sir Henry Lee for saving his prince from the hands of Cromwell (vide Woodstock), or like that of the goldsmith's son, even when he was dying, for saving the prince Chevalier from the hands of his would-be captors, is excusable in the estimation of many and even meritorious according to some. The world again is agreed that if an adulterer be called into the witness box, perjury would be a venal offence compared with the meanness of betraying the honour of a confiding woman. Hence, the exclusion of such a witness (according to almost every system of law) in trials for adultery. The Rishis wrote for men and not angels. The conduct referred to is that of the good and pious.

1118. In explaining verse 7, the commentator uses the words that I have enclosed within parenthesis. According to him, verse 9 hath reference to the robbed thief while he goes to the king for invoking justice.

1119. There is another reason why one should not give way to intoxication of might and should not set at naught the eternal injunction against taking what belongs to another. K.P. Singha incorrectly translates this line.

1120. Implying that such a man is always alive to his own faults. He never thinks that others are guilty of an offence which he, in a moment of temptation, may have committed.

1121. K.P. Singha wrongly translates this line.

1122. The construction is not at all difficult; yet both the vernacular translators have misunderstood it, the Burdwan version being thoroughly unintelligible. This is only another form of the well-known saying—'do to others as you would that they should do to you.'

1123. The Burdwan translator gives an incorrect version of the second line: yad is equivalent to yadi: anyasya stands for anyam. The genitive inflection is used for the accusative. Tatah stands for tasmin implying aupapatye vishaye. Kuryat is driggochari-kuryat.

1124. The surplus should not be coveted for its own sake but for such use.

1125. The second line is incorrectly rendered by K.P. Singha.

1126. Priyabhyupagatam is priyena praptam and not hinsaya.

1127. I am not sure that I have understood the original correctly. Nilakantha says that the sense intended to be conveyed is that Yudhishthira finds fault with Bhishma's previous course on the indications of righteousness.

1128. The argument, as explained by the commentator is this: Bhishma has said that righteousness and its reverse arise from one's acts producing happiness or misery to others, and that they both affect one's future life in respect to the happiness and misery enjoyed or endured therein. But living creatures, says Yudhishthira, are seen to take their births, exist, and die, of their own nature. Nature, therefore, seems to be the efficient cause of birth, existence, and death, and not the declarations in the Srutis, consistent though those declarations be with considerations of felicity or the reverse. The study of the Vedas, therefore, cannot alone lead to a knowledge of righteousness and its reverse.

1129. Distress may be of infinite variety. Derogation also from duty may, therefore, be of infinite variety. It is impossible to note these derogations (justifiable in view of the degree of distress felt) in any code of morals, however comprehensive.

1130. The commentator cites the example of Sudras listening to forbidden scriptures in expectation of merit. They commit sin by such acts. Then again high Brahmanas like Agastya, by cursing the denizens of the Dandaka forest, achieved great merit. In persons universally called ordinary or even low, indications are observable of good behaviour, and in those acknowledged to be good and respectable, acts may be noticed that are not good. That therefore, which is called the conduct of the good is extremely unascertainable.

1131. The commentator cites the instance of the stoppage of the Horse-sacrifice in consequence of the interference of Indra with Janamejaya while the latter was bent upon celebrating one for the acquisition of merit.

1132. The vapoury edifices and forms seen in the distant sky are called Gandharva-nagara from the peculiar belief that they are cities or towns inhabited by the Gandharvas, a class of beings superior to men. They appear to the view only to disappear very soon. What the speaker wishes to say is that sacrifices and religious acts at first appear romantic and delightful in consequence of the fruits they hold forth, viz., heaven and felicity. But when they are examined by the light of philosophy, they disappear or shrink into nothingness, for as acts, they are transitory and their consequences too are of the same character.

1133. The object of this verse is to show that it is extremely difficult to ascertain who the good are whose conduct should be taken as the standard of righteousness.

1134. The commentator cites the instance of Drona and others of that class. These men must be regarded as Mahajanas and Sadhus, but how can their conduct be regarded as righteous? What Yudhishthira means to say is that the standards of righteousness or that by which a good man may be known, is difficult of ascertainment.

1135. The example of Viswamitra, Jamadagnya, and Vasishtha are cited by the commentator. The first won pre-eminence by his mastery over weapons. The second lost his character as a Brahmana by the profession of arms. The third lost nothing although he punished Viswamitra's insolence by using even carnal weapons.

1136. What Yudhishthira says here is that righteousness or virtue or duty does not depend upon the Srutis or the Smritis, nor upon considerations of happiness or misery. On the other hand, righteousness is arbitrary in respect of its standard, that being called righteous which was called so by the learned of ancient times. As regards happiness or misery, its cause is eternal nature.

1137. 'In this connection,' i.e., the subject of the true cause to which is to be ascribed the dispensation of happiness or its reverse.

1138. His gross body was within the water. Nevertheless, by Yoga power, he was able to rove over the world in his subtile body and beheld everything he wished to see.